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THE ISRAELI ANTI-BOYCOTT LAW:
BALANCING THE NEED FOR
NATIONAL LEGITIMACY AGAINST THE
RIGHTS OF DISSENTING INDIVIDUALS
INTRODUCTION

O

n July 11, 2011, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—
approved the controversial Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott (“Anti-Boycott Law”,
or “ABL”) which instituted civil penalties for Israeli citizens
who organize or publicly endorse boycotts against the country.1
The immediate, polarizing impact of the legislation resulted in
a charged Israeli populace, and rhetoric on both sides grew increasingly extreme.2 Critics slam the ABL as an impermissible
strike against the fundamental rights of free speech and free
expression.3 To infringe on such basic rights, they argue, is to
strike a blow against democracy and to take a step along the
path toward fascism.4 Conversely, supporters defend the ABL
as a mechanism to combat damaging economic protests against

1. Law Preventing Harm to the State of Israel by Means of Boycott, 57712011, S.H. No. 2304 p. 1 (Isr.). [hereinafter ABL]; Edmund Sanders, Israel
Law Targets Boycott Campaigns, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/12/world/la-fg-israel-boycott-20110712
(reporting that the ABL was approved by a 47-38 vote); Lahav Harkov, Antiboycott bill becomes law after passing Knesset, JERUSALEM POST (July 11,
2011), http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=228896.
2. See Bradley Burston, Israel’s boycott law: the quiet sound of going fascist, HA’ARETZ (July 12, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/a-special-placein-hell/israel-s-boycott-law-the-quiet-sound-of-going-fascist-1.372881.; but see,
Harriet Sherwood, Israel’s boycott ban draws fire from law professors, THE
GUARDIAN
(July
14,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/14/israel-boycott-ban-criticised
(quoting Prime Minister Netanyahu as saying that the criticisms of the ABL
were “reckless, irresponsible attacks against the legitimate attempt by a democracy on the defensive to draw a line between what is acceptable and what
is not.”).
3. Editorial, Not Befitting a Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/opinion/18mon2.html (quoting the AntiDefamation League warning that the ABL “impinged on the basic democratic
rights of Israelis to freedom of speech and freedom of expression,” and
Ha’Aretz that the ABL was “undemocratic.”).
4. See Burston, supra note 2.
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Israel’s policies regarding the settlements in the West Bank.5
To these supporters, protests against the state of Israel from
within its own population risks the de-legitimization of the Israeli government in the eyes of the world.6 These supporters
are quickly reminded by ABL opponents, though, that some
major international entities have already expressed dismay
over the ABL, criticizing the un-democratic nature of the law.7
With both sides of the ABL debate firmly entrenched, the Israeli Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)8 will have to render a
decisive interpretation, determining if the ABL is a valid exercise of the Knesset’s legislative authority.9 Despite what may
seem like a clear-cut violation of traditionally protected individual rights, the outcome of a challenge to the ABL is far from
certain. Israel has no formal constitution, and lacks codified
protection for the values of free speech and free expression.10
Therefore, in order to strike down the ABL, the Supreme Court
must construe these protections from Israeli legal tradition,
without the benefit of being able to point to a statute codifying
free expression.11 Yet, given the body of Israeli free speech and
5. It is common practice for groups critical of Israeli policy to undertake
“boycotts, disinvestment and sanctions” (“BDS”) against Israel. Not Befitting
a Democracy, supra note 3. Left-wing activists have embraced such tactics,
even within Israel, as a method to protest the more right-leaning government. Israeli Lawmakers Pass West Bank Settlement Boycott Law, BBC NEWS
– MIDDLE EAST (July 11, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east14111925.
6. See M.J. Rosenberg, Op-Ed, Delegitimization is Just a Distraction, L.A.
TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/opinion/la-oerosenberg-israel-20110717.
7. See, e.g. Jonathan Lis & Danna Harman, European Union expresses
concern over Israel’s new boycott law, HA’ARETZ (July 13, 2011),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/european-union-expressesconcern-over-israel-s-boycott-law-1.373076; Natasha Mozgovaya & Shlomo
Shamir, U.S. on Israeli boycott law: Freedom to protest is basic democratic
right, HA’ARETZ (July 12, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/u-s-on-israeli-boycott-law-freedom-to-protest-is-a-basic-democraticright-1.372884.
8. For the purposes of this Note, “Supreme Court” refers to the highest
court of Israel unless otherwise noted.
9. E.g., Edmund Sanders, Israel Struggles with Free-Speech Rights, L.A.
TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/31/world/la-fgisrael-free-speech-20110731.
10. See infra notes 12–15.
11. Israeli legal tradition—that is, the potential sources of law to which
the Supreme Court can look when making their decisions—include Israeli
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free expression jurisprudence, as well as international norms
and policy concerns, the Israeli Supreme Court should overturn
the ABL as an impermissible intrusion on fundamental rights.
Part I of this note provides some background information on
the Israeli legal system and the authority of the Supreme
Court. Part II examines the ABL itself, the political climate in
which the law was passed, and the reaction thereto. Part III
examines the relevant precedent regarding the protection of
free speech and free expression, first under Israeli legal tradition and then under both foreign and Jewish traditions. Finally, Part IV explains why those precedents reviewed in Part III,
combined with relevant policy concerns, mandate that the Supreme Court invalidate the ABL.
I. THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM
Any arguments for or against the validity of the ABL must be
evaluated in light of the constraints and policies of the Israeli
legal system. Section A of this Part will discuss the constitutional history of Israel and how the country has evolved to
compensate for the lack of a formal written instrument. Section
B will examine the power of the Supreme Court within Israel’s
quasi-constitutional framework and also the interaction between the Supreme Court and the Knesset. By the end of this
Part it will be clear that if the ABL is violative of Israeli law,
the Supreme Court has the power to strike it down.
A. Israeli Constitutional Law
Unlike America, Israel lacks a formal constitution to provide
direction in answering potential questions regarding basic human rights protections.12 Upon achieving statehood in 1948,
the Israeli Declaration of Independence “stipulated that a constitution would be drafted,” but no such document was ever

statutes, Israeli common law, international precedent (including American)
and the teachings and values of Judaism (“Jewish law”). See generally Daniel
Friedmann, The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law of Israel: Remnants of the
Ottoman Period, 10 ISR. L. REV. 192 (1975); Uriel Gorney, American Precedent
in the Supreme Court of Israel, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1194 (1955).
12. Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1325 (1999); See also SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 35
(2007) (“Israel has no one official document known as ‘the constitution.’”).
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produced.13 Over time, in place of a unified constitution, the
Knesset passed a series of eleven mostly procedural regulations
called the “Basic Laws,” which outlined the organization
framework of the Israeli legal system and provided protection
for some fundamental human rights.14 Taken together, the
Basic Laws comprise a de facto constitution that distills the
essence of Israeli “constitutional principles.”15
B. The Israeli Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has two different functions. First, it
serves as the final court for appeals coming from the lower levels of the Israeli court system. Second, it acts as the High Court
of Justice, with original jurisdiction to hear “matters in which
it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and
which are not within the jurisdiction of another court.”16 In
practice, the role of the High Court of Justice has often been to
resolve pending constitutional or administrative issues.17 However, unlike the American Supremacy Clause, Israeli law contained no expression of the Basic Laws’ supremacy over other
national legislation,18 resulting, for many years, in the Supreme Court’s inability to invalidate legislation with any clear
13. Maya Tarr, Regulating the Airwaves in Israeli’s Burgeoning Democracy: Why the Israeli High Court of Justice Should Have Acknowledged Free
Speech in the Case of Artuz Seven,18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 687, 691–92
(2010). The inability to pass a formal constitution is likely due to “divergent
views” on constitutional principles within Israel’s “heterogeneous” society. Id.
at 692; see also Ruth Gavison, Law, Adjudication, Human Rights, and Society, 40 ISR. L. REV. 31, 50 (2007).
14. NAVOT, supra note 12, at 36–37. The eleven basic laws are The Knesset
(1958); Israeli Lands (1960); The President of the State (1964); The Government (1968); The State Economy (1975); Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel
(1980); The Judiciary (1984); The State Comptroller (1986); Freedom of Occupation (1992); and Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). Id. at 37.
15. Asher Maoz, Constitutional Law, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL
SURVEYS at 6 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylvain Colombo eds., 1995).
16. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101, §15 (1984) (Isr.),
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm.
17. Tarr, supra note 13, at 696.
18. Compare Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Israel, 39 ISR. L. REV. 12, 17
(2006), with Bradford R. Clark, Symposium: Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism: Article: Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy
Clause, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 1422 (2008) (noting that the Supremacy
Clause provides order the hierarchy of American law by naming the Constitution as part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”).
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authority.19 This hesitancy changed in 1995, with the landmark
Supreme Court decision in United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal
Agricultural Cooperative,20 in which the Supreme Court decided that two of the Basic Laws,21 Human Dignity and Freedom
of Occupation (“Human Rights Basic Laws”), would constitute
an Israeli “Bill of Rights,” supreme to other legislation.22 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the Human Rights Basic Laws
grant the power of judicial review over “the failure of a regular
law to meet [the Human Rights Basic Laws’] requirements . . .
such a law is constitutionally flawed and the Court may declare
it void.”23 Since Migdal, the Supreme Court has been far more
aggressive in invalidating legislation that conflicts with the
Human Rights Basic Laws.24 Thus, having granted itself the
power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has established its
own authority to strike down the ABL should it find that the
ABL conflicts with the protections of the Human Rights Basic
Laws.25
19. Tarr, supra note 13, at 691. Tarr notes the lack of a law addressing the
superiority of the Basic Laws over other legislation as a possible source for
the Supreme Court’s historical hesitance to exercise Judicial Review over the
decisions of the Knesset. Id. at 692.
20. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Collective
49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.).
21. Prior to 1992, the Basic Laws were purely organizational and lacked
“meaningful safeguarding of substantive values.” Tarr, supra note 13, at 692.
The passage of the Human Rights Basic Laws has been called Israel’s “constitutional revolution” for its recognition and codification of protected civil
rights and its role in providing for judicial review. Barak, supra note 18, at
18.
22. CA 6821/93 Migdal Agricultural Collective, at 139–40.
23. Id. at 139. Migdal has been described as “the Israeli equivalent of
Marbury v. Madison.” Tarr, supra note 13, at 695.
24. Barak, supra note 18, at 21.
25. See supra notes 19–23. However, currently pending before the Supreme Court (presented in April 2012) is a proposed Basic Law that would
provide the Knesset with the authority to override a Supreme Court veto by
vote of a sixty-five member super majority (out of 120). Lahav Harkov, Joanna Paraszczuk, Rivlin Voices Support for Basic Law on Legislation,
POST
(Apr.
8,
2012),
JERUSALEM
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=265290. Under
the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, the Knesset would have the power to
enact legislation in spite of the Supreme Court’s opposition, potentially stripping the Supreme Court of its deciding vote on the ABL. See id. Supporters of
the new Basic Law view it as protection against the whims of the branch of
government least accountable to the general public, while critics worry that
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II. THE ABL
After establishing the proper authority for evaluating the validity of the ABL, the focus of the following Part turns to the
ABL itself. Section A of this Part will address the history underlying the ABL and the political motivations of each side of
the debate. Section B will examine the actual terms of the ABL
and how they could affect individuals. Section C will address
both the negative and positive reactions to the passage of the
ABL. By the end of this Part, the reader will better understand
the political motivations weighing on each side of the ABL discussion.
A. Origins of the Conflict
Israel occupies a precarious geographical place near the center of the Muslim world, surrounded by potentially hostile nations.26 Since its inception in 1948, Israel has fought numerous
wars for its very survival and its right to exist as a nation.27
Even when not faced with imminent, traditional warfare, protestors still threaten Israel’s legitimacy through economic warfare, specifically the practice of boycotts, disinvestment, and
sanctions (“BDS”)28 meant to weaken Israel’s economy.29 Today,
Israel’s policies regarding the West Bank settlements are increasingly controversial30 and, in protest, opponents of Israeli
policy have participated in international movements advocat-

the Knesset is simply removing the last remaining check on its growing power. See Nathan Jeffay, Israel in Power Struggle with Top Court, JEWISH DAILY
FORWARD (Apr. 29, 2012), http://forward.com/articles/155370/israel-in-powerstruggle-with-top-court/.
26. See, e.g., Samuel W. Lewis, United States and Israel: the Evolution of
an Unwritten Alliance, 53 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 364, 373–78 (1999).
27. See id. at 364–75.
28. See Rosenberg, supra note 6.
29. See, e.g., MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22424, THE
ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (2006) (“The Arab League has maintained
an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the
founding of Israel in 1948.”).
30. Ethan Bronner, Amid Statehood Bid, Tensions Simmer in West Bank,
TIMES
(Sept.
23,
2011),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/world/middleeast/west-bank-tensionssimmer-amid-palestinian-united-nations-statehood-bid.html?pagewanted=all.
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ing the use of BDS tactics.31 Such tactics have been advocated
by a diverse group of supporters ranging from “international,
radical pro-Palestine campaigners, Western liberals, and Israeli leftists.”32 It is this third group (Israeli leftists) that seems to
have particularly caught the attention of Israeli lawmakers
such as Knesset member Zeev Elkin, the sponsor of the ABL,
who noted that he was concerned that the boycotts have “increasingly come from within our own midst.” 33 In 2011, some
Israelis began calling for boycotts of products with links to the
West Bank settlements.34 In response, Elkin, a member of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, proposed
the ABL as a way to alleviate the damage felt by West Bank
businesses as a result of the boycott campaigns.35 The Knesset
passed the ABL by a margin of forty-seven to thirty-eight.36
B. The Provisions of the ABL
The ABL defines a boycott as “deliberately avoiding economic, cultural or academic ties with another person or body solely
because of their affinity with the State of Israel, one of its institutions or an area under its control, in such a way that may
cause economic, cultural or academic damage.”37 Under the
ABL, it is a civil offense to:

31. Natalie Rothschild, Op-Ed, Criticism of Boycott Bill by BDS Supporters
in Israel and Abroad Rings Hollow, YNET NEWS (July 13, 2011),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4094647,00.html.
32. Id.; see also, Peter Beinart, To Save Israel, Boycott the Settlements, NY
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/opinion/to-saveisrael-boycott-the-settlements.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all; Jacob Edelist,
Major British Supermarket Chain Tightens Boycott of Israeli Goods, CompaPRESS
(Apr.
29,
2012),
nies,
JEWISH
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/major-british-supermarket-chaintightens-boycott-of-israeli-goods-companies/2012/04/29/.
33. Not Befitting a Democracy, supra note 3.
34. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Anti-Boycott Law Stirs Debate on Settlement
POST
(July
22,
2011),
Products,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/israeli-anti-boycott-lawstirs-debate-on-settlement-products/2011/07/20/gIQA91LyTI_story.html.
Elkin stated that he sponsored the ABL in order to “provide legal recourse to
people harmed by boycott campaigns that targeted them because of where
they happen to live.” Id.
35. Id.
36. Harkov, supra note 1.
37. ABL, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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knowingly publish[] a public call for a boycott against the
State of Israel, where according to the content and circumstances of the publication there is reasonable probability that
the call will lead to a boycott, and he who published the call
was aware of this possibility.38

Should an individual deliberately call for a boycott in violation
of this provision, then that individual may be liable for “[punitive] damages that are independent of the [amount of] actual
damage caused.”39
C. Response to the ABL
Response to the passage of the ABL was immediate and vigorous; supporters defended the bill passionately, while opponents petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn it within days
of its passage.40 Supporters of the ABL view the law as a protection against the threat boycotts pose to the very legitimacy
of the Israeli government,41 as well as protection against the
economic and social prejudices these boycotts place upon Israeli
businesses.42 The threat to legitimacy posed by BDS actions is
especially problematic for Israel because such actions shift discussion from questions about Israel’s policies to questions over

38. Id.
39. Id. “In calculating the sum of these damages, for example, the court
will take into consideration, among other things, the circumstances under
which the wrong was carried out, its severity and its extent.” Id.
40. See Boycott Law May Backfire on Israel, RUSSIA TODAY (July 14, 2011),
http://www.rt.com/news/boycott-law-israel-backfire/; see also Burston, supra
note 2. But see, Karni Eldad, Israel’s Boycott Law is Constitutional, (July 18,
2001),
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-s-boycott-law-isconstitutional-1.373800. The state of Israel filed its defense of the ABL with
the Supreme Court in January, 2012. See Joanna Paraszczuk, Boycott Law
Constitutional Despite Difficulties, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=254084. Indeed, Ahmed
Tibi, a member of Knesset, has gone so far as to directly challenge the ABL,
publicly calling for a Canadian boycott of Israeli goods. Lahav Harkov, MK
Tibi Break Boycott Law on Trip to Canada, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=266368.
41. In South Africa, the threat of a boycott caused a massive exodus of
foreign investment, which in turn put heavy economic pressure on the South
African government. See Jennifer Frankel, Note, The Legal and Regulatory
Climate for Investment in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Historical Overview, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 191–93 (1998).
42. See Eldad, supra note 40; Greenberg, supra note 34.
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Israel’s very economic viability.43 Supporters argue that, given
such a clear threat, the ABL presents a reasonable and proportional restriction on the freedom of expression when balanced
against the interest of state security.44 Alternatively, opponents
of the ABL argue that delegitimization is not an appropriate
fear given Israel’s relative strength and prosperity,45 and that
the public’s interest in maintaining the basic right of political
speech is far too important to be abridged for such a nebulous
and long-term threat.46
III. ANALYSIS
Freedom of expression47 and democracy are inextricably
linked.48 Free expression rights “facilitate individuals in forming and joining groups for advocacy and action,” which serve as
“indispensable features” of modern society.49 Given the importance of expressive rights, many countries have provided
explicit guarantees of the freedom of expression.50 Israel is no
exception, as it legally recognizes “all human rights that characterize modern democracy,”51 among which it counts the freedom of expression. Therefore, the following sections will look at
the history of freedom of expression law in Israel, as well as
internationally, to determine whether the ABL falls within the
scope of the protection granted to this particular right.

43. Working Group Report, Co-Chairs Mitchell Bard & Gil Troy, Delegitimization of Israel: Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions, GLOBAL FORUM FOR
COMBATING
ANTI-SEMITISM
(2009),
http://www.gfantisemitism.org/Conference2009/WorkingGroups/Pages/WorkingGroupReports.aspx.
44. Eldad, supra note 40 (noting that the ABL is limited only to the sort of
public calls for boycott that could actually threaten the state, still allowing
every Israeli “to buy whatever he wants.”).
45. Rosenberg, supra note 6.
46. See Burston, supra note 2.
47. For the purposes of this Note, freedom of expression will be used as a
“catch-all” term incorporating any protected political right, including speech,
assembly, participation, and association.
48. See Henry J. Steiner, Two Sides of the Same Coin?: Democracy and
International Human Rights, 41 ISR. L. REV. 445, 446–47 (2008).
49. Id. at 447.
50. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1.
51. Barak, supra note 18, at 13.
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A. Israeli Freedom of Expression
For years, protection of political expression existed in the Israeli common law without “statutory support.”52 In 1992, the
Knesset passed the Human Rights Basic Laws, giving this protection a textual home and providing the Supreme Court with
an avenue for invalidating legislation that challenged it.53 The
Human Rights Basic Laws provide explicit protection from
deprivation of the right to “human dignity, liberty, property,
privacy, freedom of occupation, and freedom from detention,
imprisonment, and extradition.”54 However, this protection is
limited, making exceptions for violations of the Human Rights
Basic Laws made (1) in response to a valid threat to the State
of Israel and (2) narrowly tailored to meeting only the desired
end.55 Accordingly, any violation of a protected right must be
evaluated in terms of its justification and proportionality to
meeting that end.56
Freedom of expression is not explicitly provided for in the
Human Rights Basic Laws,57 so in order to receive the same
protections listed above, the Supreme Court must interpret the
law to find that expression is implicitly included.58 The Supreme Court has consistently done so by reading freedom of
expression into the explicit guarantee of human dignity provided for in the text of the Human Rights Basic Laws.59 Despite
52. Id.
53. See supra Part II.A.
54. Barak, supra note 18 at 16.
55. See Basic Law: Human Dignity, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454, §8 (1994)
(Isr.) (“No violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting
the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.”); see also Barak, supra note 18, at 16.
56. See NAVOT, supra note 12, at 41–42.
57. HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp v. Israel Police (2) IsrLR 399, 409 [2006]
(Isr.).
58. Tarr, supra note 13, at 695.
59. Barak, supra note 18, at 12, 16; Zaharah R. Markoe, Note, Expressing
Oneself Without a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 319 (2000). This construction of the Human Rights Basic Law has become
the accepted standard for the breadth of protection provided by the Basic
Laws. See, e.g. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. Ltd. v. Film Review Board
IsrLR 1, 13 [1997] (Isr.); PPA 4463/94 Golan v. Prison Service IsrLR 1, 18, 58
[1995–1996] (Isr.) (“Even without an express provision, freedom of speech is
included in human dignity, according to the meaning thereof in sections 2
and 4 of the Basic Law. For what is human dignity without the basic liberty
of an individual to hear the speech of others and to utter his own speech.”).
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the constant security threats facing Israel,60 the Supreme
Court’s integration of free expression into the fabric of the
Basic Laws is also consistent with the attitudes of the Israeli
populace, who have indicated support for “abstract democratic
principles” on a level consistent with that of the American populace.61 Since free expression is entitled to the protection of the
Supreme Court under the Human Rights Basic Laws, any violation thereof can only be justified if legislation in question is:
(1) in response to a valid threat to the State of Israel and (2)
narrowly tailored to meeting only the desired end.62
Free expression jurisprudence in Israel dates back to the
landmark decision in Kol Ha-Am v. Minister of the Interior,63 in
which the Supreme Court held free expression to be a supreme
right, well before the passage of the Basic Law: Human Dignity.64 In Kol Ha-Am, the Israeli Interior Minister had shut down
an Israeli newspaper, which had criticized Israel for its support
of military action in Korea, because he saw it as a potential
threat to the state’s safety.65 The Supreme Court held that because free expression was such a “fundamental right,”66 it cannot be abridged without being able to forecast serious danger
“almost to a certainty.”67 In this case, Supreme Court found
60. See supra Part II.A.
61. JULIE L. ANDSAGER ET AL., FREE EXPRESSION IN 5 DEMOCRATIC PUBLICS
122 (2004).
62. See supra Part II.A; Basic Law: Human Dignity, supra note 55, at §8.
63. HCJ 75/53 Kol Ha-Am v. Minister of the Interior 7 PD 871 [1953] (Isr.).
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. The right to free expression is fundamental because
[d]emocracy consists, first and foremost, of government by consent,
the opposite of government maintained by the power of the mailed
fist; and the democratic process, therefore, is one of selection of the
common aims of the people and the means of achieving them,
through the public form of negotiation and discussion, that is to say,
by open debate and the free exchange of ideas on matters of public
interest [] ‘Public opinion’ plays a vital part in that discussion, carried on through the political institutions of the state, such as parties,
general elections and debates in the legislature - and it plays that
part not only when the citizen goes to the polls, but at all times and
in all seasons.
Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 27 (“In the light of circumstances, that the publication makes it
possible, amounting almost to a certainty, that serious harm will be caused to

356

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

that the threat alleged by the Interior Minister, that of decreased confidence in the Israeli government, was insufficient.68
After the passage of the Human Rights Basic Laws, the Kol
Ha-Am near certainty standard was approved legislatively in
the Basic Law: Human Dignity.69 Just a few years after the
codification of this rule, the Supreme Court took to expanding
on the “near certainty” standard for modern application. In
Station Film Co. Ltd. v. Film Review Board, the Supreme
Court held that free expression rights (in this case, the ability
to exhibit a provocative film) were not limitless, and could be
abridged “in order to advance societal goals, such as ensuring
the country’s very existence and democratic nature, as well as
protecting the integrity of the judicial system, as well as public
peace and security.”70 However, the Supreme Court clarified
that in order to justify abridging free expression the perceived
threats must be nearly certain.71 Drawing on the Kol Ha-Am
near certainty test, the Supreme Court explained the appropriate balance as follows:
Freedom of expression may be impaired if the following two
conditions are satisfied. First the harm the expression causes
to the public peace must be serious, grave, and severe. The
harm must exceed the “level of tolerance” acceptable in a
democratic society and shake that society to its very foundation. Second, the probability of such an injury to public peace
occurring must be nearly certain. It is insufficient to say that
the harm be only possible and probable.72

In practice, the Supreme Court need not always follow this
test verbatim, but instead has the discretion to “adopt a suitable test, while considering the substance and importance of
competing principles . . . with respect to their relative priority
and the measure of protection which we would like to grant
each principle or interest.”73 For artistic censorship cases, like
the public peace, then there is nothing to prevent him from exercising the
power.”).
68. See generally id.
69. Compare id., with Basic Law: Human Dignity, supra note 55, at §8.
70. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film at 15.
71. Id at 17.
72. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. HCJ 448/85 Daher v. Minister of the Interior 40(2) IsrSC 701, 708
[1985] (emphasis in original).
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Station Film, the Supreme Court has typically allowed for
punctures in the cloak of free expression protection.74 For example, in Israel Film Studios v. Levi Geri, the Supreme Court
determined that a newsreel that presented an obviously biased
and misleading picture of a political topic did not need to be
protected because of “the newsreel’s unique ability to affect the
audience through its visual medium.”75 However, in cases
where the act of expression is not pure fiction, like Station
Film, or heavily biased (like Israel Film Studios), the Supreme
Court has been much more hesitant to restrict expression, even
if that expression is critical of Israeli policy.76 This hesitancy
was on full display when the Supreme Court held, in Bakri v.
Israel Film Council, that a documentary portraying Palestinian
reactions to Israeli terrorist activities merited the court’s protection even though it may have been anti-Israel and “offensive.”77
Beyond the context of artistic expression, the Supreme
Court’s application of the Kol Ha-am near certainty test has
skewed even more heavily toward protection of the rights of
individuals.78 In Majority Camp v. Israel Police, the Supreme
Court ruled that an interest group seeking to stage a rally in
support of a particular government action had the fundamental
right to demonstrate publicly.79 Similarly, in Levi v. Southern
District Police Commander, the Supreme Court held that the
Israeli Police did not have the ability to deny protestors the
right to demonstrate unless the police could show “substantial
evidence” of harm to public security.80 In Levi, the Committee
against the War in Lebanon, an anti-war advocacy group, had
applied for a permit to stage a march against political vio74. See, e.g., HCJ 4804/94 Station Film; HCJ 243/62 Israel Film Studios v.
Levi Geri 16 PD 2407 [1962] (Isr.).
75. Markoe, supra note 59, at 335.
76. See HCJ 316/03 Bakri v. Israel Film Council 58(1) PD 249[2003] (Isr.);
see also HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) PD 617 [1989]
(Isr.).
77. See HCJ 316/03 Bakri at 30.
78. See, e.g., HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp at 409.
79. “A demonstration that has a political or social background is an expression of the autonomy of the individual will, freedom of choice, and freedom of action that are included within the scope of human dignity as a constitutional right.” HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp at 411.
80. HCJ 153/83 Levi v. S. Dist. Police Commander, 38(2) PD 393, 416
[1984] (Isr.).
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lence.81 The Israeli police denied the permit application on the
grounds that it was being planned for the anniversary of the
murder of a leader in the peace movement and the police feared
that the protest would incite violence and threaten public safety.82 The Supreme Court found the police’s “serious apprehension over a grave threat to public order and security” was not
enough for the Court to allow them to suspend the protestors’
right to express themselves under the clear probability test.83
However, the Supreme Court does not rule in favor of free
expression in every instance. For example, in State of Israel v.
Kahanae, the Supreme Court allowed for a revocation of free
expression rights in the case of a radical politician, Binyamin
Kahanae, who had been convicted of sedition for voicing antigovernment rhetoric.84 Kahanae had been distributing pamphlets, in response to terrorist attacks, advocating for government-sanctioned violence against Arab villages within Israel.85
After a series of reversals,86 the Supreme Court (using the familiar language of the Hol Ha-Am test) found a “near certainty” that the defendant’s continued discourse would harm the
government “structure.”87 The Supreme Court also explained
that the law of sedition was designed to protect the value of
“social cohesiveness,” and Kahanae’s actions posed a direct
threat to this value.88 Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that a violation of social cohesiveness presented potentially dire consequences for the state of Israel.89 Taken togeth81. Id.
82. Id.; Markoe, supra note 59, at 341.
83. HCJ 153/83 Levi at 418–19; Markoe, supra note 59, at 340–41.
84. CrimFH 1789/98 State of Israel v. Kahane 54(5) PD 193, 232, 233
[2000] (Isr.). Sedition in Israeli law is defined as “promot[ing] feelings of illwill and enmity between different sections of the population.” Miriam GurArye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli Experience, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 162–63 (2003).
85. CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane at 197.
86. The trial court initially acquitted Kahane, but the appellate court convicted him on appeal. Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 168–72. The Supreme
Court overturned Kahane’s conviction then finally reinstated it upon rehearing. Id.; CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane.
87. Id. at 199, 225.
88. Id. at 213–15; Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 170.
89. Justice Or noted that the value of social cohesiveness “is of special importance against the background of a society with a varied social mosaic like
the state of Israel, in which minorities, and members of different religious
sects, live side by side and in which the differences among the various popu-
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er, the probability and severity of the harm threatened by Kahanae’s actions was enough for the Supreme Court to uphold
Kahanae’s conviction and to quash his freedom of expression.90
The final category of expression discussed by the Supreme
Court, although far less conclusively, is commercial expression.91 In Kidum Yazmuth U’Molut v. Broadcasting Authority,
the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether an advertiser had the right to display controversial advertisements.92 The
advertisement in question was the slogan of Kidum, which in
fact meant “Go Excel,” but also “provoked the connotation” of a
Hebrew curse word.93 The Israeli Broadcasting Authority decided to prohibit the display of this advertisement on the
grounds that it “includes an offense to good taste or contradicts
public order or harms the public.” Kidum filed suit, alleging an
infringement of their right to free expression.94 The Supreme
Court agreed with Kidum, finding that the actions of the
Broadcasting Authority were a violation of Israeli free expression tradition.95 The Supreme Court cautioned, though, that
while free expression is a “superlative right” entitled to the
highest protection of the Court, purely commercial expression
does not threaten political or democratic participation like other types of expression and may therefore be subject to lesser
protection.96 However, the Supreme Court stopped short of categorizing Kidum’s advertisement as falling outside of this lesser protection, invalidating the Broadcasting Authority’s deci-

lation groups that live in it are significant. Its value is in ensuring the existence of a multi-cultural, pluralistic society, and in preventing the disintegration of the social fabric.” CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane, at 214; Gur-Arye, supra
note 84, at 170–71.
90. See CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane; Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 170–71.
91. See RAPHAEL COHEN ALMAGOR, THE SCOPE OF TOLERANCE: STUDIES ON
THE COSTS OF FREE EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 94–99 (2006) (describing in detail H.C.J. 606/93 Kidum Yazmuth U’Molut v. Broadcasting
Authority 48 (2) PD 8 [1995] (Isr.)).
92. Id.
93. “Go Excel in Hebrew is lech titzayen. Go Fuck Yourself is lech tizdayen.” Id. at 94 n.35
94. Id. at 94.
95. Id.
96. See id.; see also Amit M. Schejter, Art Thou for Us, or for Our Adversaries? Communicative Action and the Regulation of Product Placement: A
Comparative Study and a Tool for Analysis, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89,
111 (2006).
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sion because the commercial expression in question did not “seriously offend public sensibilities.”97
Taken as a whole, Israeli law provides strong protection for
the rights of individuals to express themselves, so long as that
expression does not immediately threaten the public order with
serious harm.98 Given Israel’s precarious political reality,99
maintaining the proper balance point for Israeli society is a difficult task.100 However, the Supreme Court has generally protected the rights of the minority to express themselves, particularly in the political context without evidence of truly extreme
danger.101
B. Foreign Freedom of Expression
1. American Free Expression
Aside from Israeli law, the Supreme Court often relies on foreign precedent to provide guidance on thorny issues of first impression.102 Chief among the bodies of foreign precedent considered by the Supreme Court is American law, to which the Supreme Court turns with frequency.103 Both evolving from the
British common law model,104 Israeli law and American law
share many of the same foundational principles and “reasoning.”105
American law distinguishes between political and commercial
expression in determining the appropriate level of government
intervention.106 Regarding political expression, American law
requires that “the government must show an imminent threat

97. ALMAGOR, supra note 91, at 94.
98. See supra notes 64–83.
99. See supra notes 26–36.
100. See id.
101. See supra notes 64–90.
102. Gorney, supra note 11, at 1210.
103. Id. (“. . . American [law] occupies a ‘prominent place’ [in Israeli jurisprudence].”).
104. Id. Like America, Israel emerged from British rule and began to fashion its legal system from the existing British common law model. See generally NAVOT, supra note 12, at 35–37; Gorney, supra note 11, at 1210.
105. Id. at 1210.
106. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984).
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of harm before regulating [expression].”107 Indeed, the American concept of “clear and present danger” served as the model
for the “substantially similar” near certainty test developed by
the Supreme Court to evaluate violations of the freedom of expression.108 Within the political expression context, U.S. courts
have consistently found that the right of citizens to boycott domestic business is unquestionably protected by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.109 In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., the United States Supreme Court ruled that
participants in a damaging boycott of white-owned business
could not be held liable for damages sustained by local businesses, because the value of the expression was more important than the potential harm.110 Commercial expression, on
the other hand, does not receive the broad constitutional protection received by political speech in America.111
However, constitutional protection for boycott expression
does not extend universally to all potential boycotts. In 1979, in
response to the Arab boycott of Israel, Congress passed the Export Administration Act (“EAA”) which prohibited “any United
States person” from taking action “with intent to comply with,
further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign
country against a country which is friendly to the United
States.”112 The seemingly broad reach of the EAA is actually far
narrower than it first appears.113 The EAA was passed to combat the practice of “secondary boycotts,” whereby the Arab
countries that were boycotting Israel (the “primary boycott”)

107. Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 977 (2010). The imminence Gey refers to is
described as the “clear and present danger standard.” Id. at n.27.
108. See HCJ 75/53 Kol Ha-Am; Tarr, supra note 13, at 695.
109. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Michael
C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409
(1984).
110. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886.
111. See Briggs & Stratton Corp., 728 F.2d 915.
112. 50 U.S.C App. §2407 (1979). Action, in terms of the EAA includes a
wide variety of activities including refusing to do business with the boycotted
country or furnishing information about a company’s relationship with the
boycotted country. Id.; Nina J. Lahoud, Federal and New York State AntiBoycott Legislation: The Preemption Issue, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 371,
372 (1981).
113. See Lahoud, supra note 112, at 373.
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would boycott any U.S companies that participated in trade
with Israel.114
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of the EAA in Briggs & Stratton
Corp. v. Baldridge.115 There, Briggs & Stratton, a major American corporation claimed that the EAA violated their free expression rights because they could not respond to questionnaires116 from Arab companies who were participating in the
Arab boycott of Israel.117 The Seventh Circuit rejected the corporation’s claims and upheld the provisions of the EAA, distinguishing between those strict protections afforded to political
expression and the lesser protection available for commercial
expression.118 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit decided that
Briggs & Stratton’s participation in the Arab questionnaires
was not political speech because “[Briggs & Stratton] do not
seek to answer the questionnaire in order to influence the Arabs decision to conduct or enforce a trade boycott with Israel.”119 Instead, filling out the questionnaire was merely commercial speech because Briggs & Stratton’s motivation in filling out the questionnaires was simply that “they wish[ed] . . .
to show that the boycott’s sanctions should not be applied to
them . . . .”120 In further defending the constitutionality of the
EAA, the Seventh Circuit noted that Briggs and Stratton were,
“free to communicate their views about the relative merits of
the Arabs’ political decisions,” and it was only the secondary
participation in a foreign boycott that was prohibited.
American law thus clearly defines the boundaries of expression regulation. Political expression is afforded the heightened
protection of an imminent danger standard, while commercial
expression can be infringed at the government’s discretion. In
the boycott context, the law is similarly clear. Primary boycott114. Id at 378–79. Indeed, the United States recognized the right of the
Arab countries to engage in the primary boycott of Israel, just not the secondary boycott. Id.
115. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 728 F.2d 915.
116. In conjunction with their boycott of Israel, Arab countries would send
questionnaires to U.S. businesses to gauge their degree of trade with Israel,
and then if the questionnaire revealed trade with Israel, they would initiate
secondary boycotts of the responding company. Id. at 916.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 917–18.
119. Id. at 917.
120. Id.
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ing, that is, direct expressions of political will through economic measures, is entitled to full free expression protection. Secondary boycotts, commercial in nature, do not merit similar
protection. The link between the boycott standard and the general expression standard is clear. Where a restriction on expression or boycott threatens an individual’s ability to participate in democracy (i.e. political speech or a primary boycott),
this restriction is impermissible.121 However, where the individual’s interests at stake are something less central than
democratic rights (i.e. economic rights, secondary boycott participation), regulation is permitted much more freely.122
2. International Free Expression
The international legal community has paid increasing attention to issues of human rights, particularly with respect to participation in the political process.123 Members of that community agree that, “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,”124 and that “every citizen [has a right]
to ‘take part’ in the ‘conduct of public affairs.’”125 The U.N. further expanded these guarantees in 1996 when they explained
that it lies implicit in the guarantee of participation in public
affairs that every citizen have the opportunity to “exert[] influence through public debate, conduct[] a dialogue with their representatives, and exercis[e] their capacity to ‘organize themselves.’”126 Such guarantees speak to the high level of importance placed on free expression, especially political expression, by the international community.
As for the ABL, its provisions clearly limit the ability for Israeli citizens to “organize themselves” by forming boycotts of
Israeli products or businesses.127 Furthermore, boycotts certainly represent the ability of individuals to attempt to take
121. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886.
122. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp., 728 F.2d 915.
123. Steiner, supra note 48, at 450–52.
124. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, ¶ 21,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 art. 25.
126. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights , The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996).
127. ABL, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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part in government by influencing their countries policies.
Therefore, the ABL is out of step with the protections for political freedom of expression rights advanced by the international
community with increasing frequency.
3. Jewish Freedom of Expression
A central part of Israel’s identity is its status as the “state of
the Jewish people.”128 Accordingly, the teachings and values of
Judaism have played a major role in shaping Israel’s legal system.129 As a preliminary matter, Israel has established a series
of religious courts, separate from the secular court system, to
adjudicate religious issues that may arise.130 For secular
courts, including the Supreme Court, the precise value of Jewish law as precedent is uncertain.131 What is certain, however,
is that Jewish law serves, at the very least, as a guideline for
the moral principles of the state of Israel to which the Supreme
Court may turn when informing their decisions on difficult issues.132

128. See NAVOT, supra note 12, at 309.
129. IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
111 (1975). (“Religious institutions… are interlocked with the state’s legal
system.”).
130. NAVOT, supra, note 12, at 144–45.
131. David Wermuth, Note, Human Rights in Jewish Law: Contemporary
Juristic and Rabbinic Conceptions, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1101, 1102 (2011).
Wermuth notes that Jewish law is used primarily as “decoration,” and that
“decisions incorporating Jewish law account for a relatively minor proportion
of [Supreme Court] decisions.” Id. (quoting CJJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. State of
Israel 34(1) IsrSC 1, 17 [1980] (Isr.)). But see Menachem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 241 (1985) (“[T]he laws of
the state have absorbed many Jewish legal principles . . . . [T]he decisions of
Israel’s courts, particularly those of the Supreme Court, frequently cite Jewish law both for the sake of comparison with other legal systems and as a
source of decision.”).
132. The Knesset acknowledged Jewish law as an important piece of judicial decision-making in passing the “Foundations of the Law Act”, which
read: “where a court, faced with a legal question requiring decision, finds no
answer to it in statute law, or case law or by analogy, it shall decide the issue
in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of the Jewish heritage.” NAVOT, supra, note 12, at 73; See also Nahum Rakover, Modern
Application of Jewish Law 209, 210, Vol. I, Jewish Legal Heritage Society
(1992) (“The justice that we are obliged and endeavour to do will be more certain and more solidly grounded if it finds support in our legal tradition and in
the righteous wisdom of our forebears.”) (quoting El. A. 2/84 Neiman v.
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In Jewish tradition, freedom of expression has long existed as
an implied right within some of Judaism’s oldest and most central tenets.133 The foundation of biblical human rights protection is the central tenet that men were created in the “very image of God,” and therefore each individual is deserving of equal
respect in relation to every other person.134 From this idea,
Jewish tradition evolved to protect the ability of individuals to
express themselves, even when they are in an unpopular minority, as the thoughts and words of all those created in God’s
image are entitled to equal respect.135 An early example of free
expression principles comes from examination of the writings of
the biblical prophets.136 Despite the fact that every prophet
claimed to be espousing God’s word, the writings of the prophets were all quite different and often in conflict with one another.137 However, the fact that “all [prophets] were permitted to
function and indeed, as the pages of the Bible bear witness, to
preserve considerable sections of their literary activity for posterity,” speaks to the importance that early Jewish society
placed on the ability to express differing viewpoints.138 Similarly, in a dispute between two important Rabbis, the Sanhedrin
(an ancient high court of Jewish law)139 decided to allow both to
continue teaching because Judaism thrives on the differing interpretations that come from allowing everyone to express their
own views.140
Beyond allowing the existence of disparate and often conflicting viewpoints, Jewish law clearly points to protecting the
Chairman of the Central Elections Committee of the Eleventh Knesset P.D.
225 [1985] (Isr.)).
133. Robert Gordis, Judaism: Freedom of Expression and the Right to
Knowledge in the Jewish Tradition, 54 COLUMBIA L. REV. 676, 680 (1954).
134. Shimon Shetreet, International Protection of Human Rights in Israeli
Law, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE XII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 307, 308, (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1986).
135. See, e.g., Gordis, supra note 133, at 680.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 682. See also Rakover, supra note 132, at 210. (“Pluralism is …
the essence of [Jewish law].”).
139. “The Sanhedrin, consisting of 70–72 individuals, was the highest judicial authority in the ancient nation of Israel. It ceased to function as a legal
authority about the time the Talmud was finished.” Seth E. Lipner, Methods
of Dispute Resolution: Torah to Talmud to Today, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 315,
317 n.4 (2005).
140. Id.
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rights of individuals on a broader level.141 The Book of Leviticus lays the groundwork for the fundamental protection of individual liberty in stating, “thou shalt proclaim liberty
throughout the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof.”142 By
extension, the Torah’s discussion of liberty can be extended to
individual freedoms, including the freedom of expression.143
Another core Judaic concept that speaks to a broad protection
of individual rights is Rabbi Hillel’s classic exhortation, “Do not
do to another what you would not wish to be done to you – that
is the whole of Jewish law, everything else is but commentary
and elaboration.”144 Similarly, “Rabbi Akiba [citing a biblical
phrase] stated, . . . ‘thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’”145
Together, these quotes reflect the idea that, “[o]ne of the fundamental principles in Jewish law is that there should be no
discrimination between individuals, who all alike are created in
the image of God.”146 Limiting the free expression rights of a
particular class of individuals is precisely the type of discrimination prohibited under these tenets because to distinguish between the value of the expression of different people is to distinguish between people who were created in the image of
God.147 Therefore any government action that seeks to discriminate between groups of individuals on the basis of their right
to express themselves stands in conflict with Jewish legal tradition.
C. Policy Concerns
Aside from legal concerns, Israel must also consider the political and financial repercussions of the ABL’s passage. First,
Israel receives an enormous amount of money from its allied
countries.148 Chief among those allies is the United States.149
The United States and other members of the international
141. See generally Shetreet, supra note 134, at 307–12.
142. Id. at 309 (quoting Leviticus 25:10).
143. See Shetreet, supra note 134, at 309.
144. Id. (citing Justice Haim Cohn, The Spirit of Israel Law, 9 Is. L.R.
456,461 (1974)).
145. Id. at 310.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See JEREMY SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33222, U.S. FOREIGN
AID TO ISRAEL (2008).
149. See id.
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community have voiced their extreme displeasure with the
ABL.150 Therefore, Israel may risk losing some, indeed perhaps
a significant portion, of its financial support should it fail to
strike down the ABL. Second, given the politically charged atmosphere in Israel and the Middle East,151 and in light of recent accusations of substandard human rights protections in its
dealings with the Palestinians,152 Israel risks further damage
to its own public image. These accusations of human rights violations have led to international backlash, and mounting anger, against Israeli policy, and Israel may lose precious political
capital and alienate some of its most loyal allies by affirming
the ABL.153 Such a delicate political climate speaks to the importance of Israel maintaining a positive public image in the
international community in order to continue fiscal stability
and political viability as an independent nation.
IV. SYNTHESIS
Regardless of the prism through which it is viewed, be it Israeli law, foreign law, or religious law, the ABL is an impermissible violation of the right to free expression. Beginning
with Israeli law, the Supreme Court allows for restrictions in
violation of the right to free expression only where the government can show both severe harm to the public and a near certainty that severe is harm flowing from the expression in question.154 In contrast with the severity of harm that has been
deemed sufficiently dangerous to impinge of free expression
rights, the harm addressed by the ABL is relatively minor. In
Kahanae, the Supreme Court found that the harm posed by a
seditious individual who was advocating for the extermination
of entire villages of Arab-Israelis was sufficiently severe to jus-

150. See supra Part II.C. See also Harkov, supra note 1.
151. See supra notes 26–32.
152. See, e.g., Annual Report 2010, PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
available at http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2011/Annual%202010%20E.pdf.
(“The human rights situation in the [Occupied Territories] continued to deteriorate throughout 2010; Israeli forces continued to perpetrate grave breaches
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and
committed more crimes against Palestinian civilians and their property.”).
153. See Burston, supra note 2. See also Lis, supra note 7; Mozgovaya, supra note 7.
154. See HCJ 4804/94 Station Film at 17.
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tify infringing on that individual’s right to free expression.155
Further defining the boundary of free expression, in Bakri, the
Supreme Court held that the harm posed by the exhibition of a
film critical of Israel, such as delegitmization and public order,
was insufficient to meet the severity of harm requirement.156
Looking at Kahanae and Bakri, the Supreme Court has clearly
distinguished between physical harm and other more intangible harms, finding that only when the public faced physical
danger was the government justified in limiting the freedom of
expression.157 In the case at hand, the harm that the ABL purports to prevent is much more analogous to Bakri than to Kahanae. The West Bank boycotts pose no direct threat to human
safety, amounting only to potential pecuniary damages or delegitimization of the government.158 Therefore, the degree of
harm purported to be protected by the ABL is insufficient to
require an exemption from the protection of freedom of expression.159
The ABL also fails to meet the Kol Ha-Am near certainty
standard because its harms are far too remote. The Supreme
Court has established an extremely high bar for the certainty
with which harm must flow from a particular expression to justify that expression’s suppression.160 In Kahanae, the Supreme
Court determined that an active call for violence was sufficiently certain to cause harm to the public, and therefore interference with free expression rights was justified.161 However, in
Levi, the Supreme Court determined that even the police’s “serious apprehension over a grave threat to public order and security” was not enough certainty to justify restriction.162 Together, Kahanae and Levi reflect the exacting nature of this
near certainty standard.163 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems
to have cumulatively stated that an actual call to violence and
the threat of violence, even when verified by the local police, is

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane.
See HCJ 316/03 Bakri.
Compare CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane, with HCJ 316/03 Bakri.
See supra Part II.B; see also ABL, supra note 1.
See HCJ 316/03 Bakri.
Compare HCJ 153/83 Levi, at 416, with CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane.
CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane.
HCJ 153/83 Levi, at 419.
Compare HCJ 153/83 Levi, with CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane.
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not enough to meet the standard.164 In the present case, the
ABL falls well short of this high bar. Unlike a call to violence,
the effects of a boycott are quite remote.165 Indeed, it is likely
that the economic consequences of any boycott on the country
as a whole would not be felt for some time.166 Applying the high
bar set by the Supreme Court, the ABL clearly lacks adequate
justification under the probability prong of the Kol-Ha-Am near
certainty test.
Alternatively, supporters of the ABL could argue that, as discussed in Kidum, the ABL addresses commercial expression
(boycotts being economic in nature), and therefore may be subject to a less strict standard.167 After all, the Supreme Court
has been more lenient in allowing restrictions in the realm of
film censorship (a commercial activity), as noted in Part III. A
of this Note.168 Indeed, the argument continues, the expression
in those cases is most similar to the ABL because they each regard offensive expressions that threaten the public order.
However, such an argument misses the mark. First, the Supreme Court has refrained from actually deciding that commercial expression receives a lower standard, instead merely
suggesting that it might.169 Second, even if commercial expression were entitled to a lower standard, the ABL does not deal
with commercial expression because the Supreme Court distinguished commercial expression on the grounds that purely
commercial expression does not implicate the democratic rights
of the expressing individual.170 For censorship cases like Station Film and Israeli Film Studios, this distinction holds
true.171 An inability to exhibit one’s creative work does not infringe on one’s ability to participate in the political process, only one’s ability to make money. By contrast, the ABL strikes at
the very heart of an individual’s right to participate in the
democratic process. The boycotts targeted under the ABL are
clear examples of political expression aimed at the policies of

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See Rosenberg, supra note 6.
Id.
See ALMAGOR, supra note 91.
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the Israeli government.172 To prevent individuals from participating in political discourse in this way is precisely the type of
violation of a “supreme right” that the Supreme Court distinguished in Kidum.
Jewish law will, additionally, advise the Supreme Court that
the ABL is an invalid exercise of legislative discretion.173 Cumulatively, the totality of Jewish legal tradition speaks to the
protection of the rights of individuals174 and the Torah provides
for individuals to be treated freely and without discrimination.175 The ABL stands in direct conflict with these principles.
Primarily, by limiting the expression of those unhappy with the
direction of the Israeli government, the Knesset is running
afoul of the Jewish tradition of protecting the voices of dissident elements of society.176 Moreover, the ABL restricts the
“liberty” of those who seek to engage in boycotts, in direct violation of the provisions of Leviticus.177
American law, despite stemming from origins similar to Israeli law, also provides no support for the ABL. Recall that, as
a preliminary matter, American law distinguishes between political speech (strictly protected) and commercial speech (less
protected).178 The boycotts targeted by the ABL are not commercial expression, but are instead clear examples of political
expression, representing protests of Israeli policies.179 Therefore, through the lens of American law, the ABL would still fail
as it is entitled to the same strict, “near certainty” standard
applied in Israeli law.180
However, even under American law’s more permissive commercial expression standard, the ABL cannot pass muster. As
noted in Part III.B, United States courts have permitted government prohibition on boycott participation, but only where
the boycotts in question are secondary, and not related to the

172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See supra Part III.B.3.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.; Leviticus 25:10.
178. See supra Part III.B.1.
179. See Burston, supra note 2. See also Lis, supra note 7; Mozgovaya, supra note 7.
180. See supra note 101.
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individual’s political rights.181 Similar to the ABL, the EAA
presents the possibility of enforcing pecuniary penalties on parties advocating for a boycott.182 However, the ABL and American anti-boycott legislation are easily distinguishable. Crucially, the ABL is a ban on domestic boycotting of domestic business (primary), while the American regulations concern participation in foreign boycotts (secondary).183 Primary boycotts
merit a court’s protection far more than participation in a secondary boycott because domestic boycotts are an avenue for
participation in one’s own government, a practice firmly established as a fundamental right.184 However, participation in a
secondary boycott has been established as a non-political expression.185 Therefore, while America does have anti-boycott
regulations in force, they would not justify a law analogous to
Israel’s ABL.
Nor does International law provide justification for the ABL.
Similar to both Israeli and American law, international law has
provided for the fundamental right to participate in one’s government.186 As described above, the ABL represents an impermissible violation of an individual’s right to participate in democracy.187 The ABL thus runs afoul of the principles of international law and cannot be justified as an appropriate restriction of the Israeli populace’s right to express themselves.
CONCLUSION
The ABL is a violation of the right to free expression, whether analyzed from an Israeli, American, Jewish, or international
perspective. To impinge on such a fundamental human right,
particularly as it pertains to participation in the political process, is an impermissible blow to the power of the individual.
Furthermore, given that the ABL lacks support from the inter181. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984).
182. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT:
BUREAU
OF
INDUSTRY
AND
SECURITY,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/antiboycottcompliance.ht
m (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). In fact, these regulations allow for criminal
penalties for violators, which the ABL does not even contemplate. Id.
183. See supra Part III.B.1.
184. See Briggs & Stratton Corp., 728 F.2d 915.
185. Id.
186. See supra Part III.B.2.
187. See supra note 172.
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national community upon whom Israel relies for financial contributions, continued adherence to the ABL could have disastrous effects on Israel as a whole. Therefore, when considering
the legal and practical concerns posed by the ABL,188 it is clear
that the Supreme Court should strike down the law as unconstitutional.
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